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ABSTRACT
Liquidity risk in banking has been attributed to transactions deposits and their potential to spark runs
or panics. We show instead that transactions deposits help banks hedge liquidity risk from unused
loan commitments. Bank stock-return volatility increases with unused commitments, but the increase
is smaller for banks with high levels of transactions deposits. This deposit-lending risk management
synergy becomes more powerful during periods of tight liquidity, when nervous investors move
funds into their banks. Our results reverse the standard notion of liquidity risk at banks, where runs
from depositors had been seen as the cause of trouble.
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I.  Introduction 
Banks have traditionally provided liquidity on demand, both to borrowers with 
open lines of credit and un-drawn loan commitments (we use these terms 
interchangeably), and to depositors in the form of checking and other transactions 
accounts.  Both contracts allow customers to receive cash on short notice.  In fact, the 
combination of these two products in a single firm constitutes a reasonable working 
definition of a ‘bank’.  The liquidity insurance role of banks, however, exposes them to 
the risk that they will have insufficient cash to meet random demands from their 
depositors and borrowers.  In this paper, we show that combining these two products 
actually reduces risk and can thus help explain the traditional structure of banks.
1 
There is a large theoretical literature that attempts to understand banks’ role in 
liquidity production.  This literature initially emphasized the risks associated with 
demand deposits that expose banks to the possibility of a catastrophic run.  Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) explain the structure of banks by arguing that by pooling their funds in an 
intermediary, agents can insure against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks while still investing 
most of their wealth in high-return but illiquid projects.  This structure, however, leads to 
the potential for a self-fulfilling bank run and sets up a policy rationale for deposit 
insurance.  More recent theoretical and empirical studies have focused on liquidity risk 
                                                 
1  Previous research identifies several other reasons why banks combine deposits and loans.  For example, 
Fama (1985) suggests that information stemming from the business checking account could give banks an 
advantage in lending over other financial intermediaries; for recent empirical evidence, see Mester, 
Nakamura, and Renault (2002).  Berlin and Mester (1999) argue that banks’ access to inelastically supplied 
funds (core deposits) allows them to offer borrowers insurance against credit shocks.  Other studies suggest 
that because bank loans are illiquid, and thus make “bad” collateral against which to borrow, the optimal 
capital structure is one characterized by very liquid (or short-term) liabilities that subject the bank to the 
possibility of a run (e.g., Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Flannery (1994), and Diamond and Rajan (2001)).  
For a summary of empirical evidence, see Strahan (2005).   2
coming from the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet.
2  Banks that make commitments 
to lend are exposed to the risk of unexpected liquidity demands from their borrowers. 
This paper presents a systematic empirical analysis of liquidity risk stemming 
from both sides of bank balance sheets.  We study how deposit taking and commitment 
lending interact.  We find that asset-side and liability-side liquidity risks are offsetting 
rather than reinforcing, meaning that combining deposits and commitment lending 
provide a liquidity-risk hedge for banks. 
Our point of departure is the model presented by Kashyap, Rajan and Stein 
(2002), hereafter KRS, who explain why banks tend to combine transactions deposits 
with loan commitments based on a risk-management motivation: as long as the demand 
for liquidity from depositors through the checking account is not highly correlated with 
liquidity demands from borrowers, an intermediary will be able to reduce its need to hold 
cash by serving both customers.  Thus, their model yields a diversification synergy 
between demand deposits (or transactions deposits more generally) and loan 
commitments.  As evidence, KRS report a robust correlation across banks between 
unused loan commitments and transactions deposits.  The correlation is robust to 
variations in the definition of loan commitments, to bank size, and is also consistent 
across time.  However, KRS do not test the key idea in their model – the idea that by 
exposing themselves to asset-side and liability-side liquidity risks simultaneously, banks 
can actually enjoy a diversification, or risk reducing, synergy. 
In this paper, we test the basic premise of the KRS model – that liquidity risks 
                                                 
2 For example, Berger and Bouwman (2005) document the importance of banks in liquidity production and 
show that this role has grown sharply over time.  There is also a growing literature showing the liquidity-
risk management or liquidity shocks to banks affect loan supply.  See Paravisini (2004), Kwaja and Mian 
(2005), Loutskina (2005) and Loutskina and Strahan (2006). 
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stemming from the two fundamental businesses of banking yield a diversification benefit.  
The results suggest that bank risk, measured by stock return volatility, increases with 
unused loan commitments, reflecting asset-side liquidity risk exposure.  This increase, 
however, is mitigated by transactions deposits.  In fact, risk does not increase with loan 
commitments for banks with transactions deposits in the top third of the distribution. 
Table 1 illustrates our key finding in a simple and intuitive way.  The table reports 
our measure of risk (average stock-return volatility, equal to the annualized return 
standard deviation) for large, publicly traded banks, along with several bank 
characteristics, including a liquidity ratio (cash + securities to assets), total assets, Fed 
Funds purchased to assets, and the ratio of equity to assets.
3  We divide the data into nine 
cells, based on the level of loan commitments (unused commitments divided by unused 
commitments plus loans) and the level of transactions deposits (relative to total deposits).  
Each cell reports the simple average for all observations in that part of the distribution.  
Looking across rows, stock-return volatility (our measure of risk) clearly increases with 
loan commitments for banks with low and moderate levels of transactions deposits 
(columns 1 and 2).  But, risk does not increase for banks with high levels of transactions 
deposits (column 3).  In other words, loan commitments do not seem to expose banks 
with high levels of transactions deposits to much risk. 
Table 1 also shows that banks with high levels of unused commitments tend to be 
larger than average.  Moreover, banks that operate without the benefit of high levels of 
transactions deposits hold more cash than other banks (last row of column 1).  Thus, the 
high balance sheet liquidity held by these banks does not fully offset the risk from 
liquidity exposure associated with high levels of unused commitments.  Banks with 
                                                 
3 We describe our sample and data in detail below.   4
unused commitments thus can conserve on holding cash by funding themselves with 
transactions deposits.
4 
In the empirical analysis below, we show that this result holds up in a regression 
context, even after controlling for bank size (which is correlated with unused 
commitments), as well as measures of market and credit risk exposure.  The result is 
robust to alternative measures of stock-return volatility, to statistical modeling 
approaches, as well as to variations in the set of control variables included in the model.  
We then extend the benchmark results by testing how the deposit-lending 
diversification synergy varies with market conditions.  The hedging benefits of 
combining loan commitments and transactions deposits are strongest when market-wide 
liquidity supply is low, which we proxy with the Commercial Paper–Treasury Bill spread 
(wide spreads indicate low liquidity).  For banks with the highest levels of transactions 
deposits, risk actually decreases with the level of unused commitments when spreads are 
high.  The deposit-lending hedge is most powerful when the short-term credit markets 
become expensive because banks face increased take-down demands from borrowers 
constrained by tight market conditions at the same time that they experience funding 
inflows into their transactions deposits (Gatev and Strahan, 2006).  These inflows and 
outflows of liquidity offset, thus strengthening the risk-management synergy.  Our results 
thus show that transactions deposits play a critically important role in allowing banks to 
manage their liquidity risk, especially during periods of market pullbacks.  The findings 
                                                 
4 We do not explicitly model the tradeoffs associated with banks’ varying their levels of balance sheet 
liquidity (cash and securities) to manage risks from unused commitments or deposits.  Banks choose these 
levels jointly, along with other capital structure policies such as leverage and debt maturity.  A full analysis 
of the substitutability across these financial policies would require a set of identifying instruments.  Instead, 
we focus on the co-variation between these endogenous financial variables and our outcome measure, the 
bank’s stock-return volatility.   5
strengthen the KRS theoretical argument, and they help explain the robust positive 
correlation across banks between transaction deposits and loan commitments, both over 
time and across a wide range of economies. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section provide a brief 
summary of some previous research.  In Section III, we explain the sample design and 
our empirical strategy, and the results are presented in Section IV.  Section V provides 
some concluding remarks. 
 
II.  Background and previous research 
The growth of the commercial paper market and subsequently of the junk bond 
market in the 1980s and 1990s suggests that the role of banks in the financing of large 
businesses has been diminished (Mishkin and Strahan, 1998).  However, this noted 
evolution away from banks and toward the securities markets has not rendered banks 
irrelevant (see Boyd and Gertler, 1994).  While banks do provide less funding than 
before, they remain important to large firms as providers of backup liquidity support to 
the commercial paper market financing.  Banks act as the “liquidity provider of last 
resort” by promising to offer cash on demand through commercial paper backup lines of 
credit.
5  Banks also continue to provide liquidity to customers through their role as 
issuers of transactions deposits. 
Why do banks provide liquidity to both sets of customers?  To the extent that 
liquidity demands are independent across both businesses and depositors, a bank can use 
scale-related diversification to mitigate its need to hold cash to meet unexpected liquidity 
                                                 
5 Banks also continue to bear significant credit risk through off-balance sheet guarantees such as standby letters 
of credit. 
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demands from its depositors and borrowers.
6  Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) present a 
model based on this notion, in which a risk-management motive explains the combination 
of transactions deposits and loan commitments.  They argue that as long as the demand 
for liquidity from depositors through the checking account is not highly correlated with 
liquidity demands from borrowers, an intermediary will be able to reduce its need to hold 
cash by serving both customers.  Thus, their model yields a diversification synergy 
between transactions deposits and unused loan commitments.   
This synergy helps explain the basic structure of banks.  As evidence, KRS show 
that banks offering more transaction deposits tend also to make more loan commitments.  
In Gatev and Strahan (2006), we suggest a stronger hypothesis, supported by our findings 
that the correlation is not only low but is in fact negative.  Transactions deposits can be 
viewed as a natural hedge because flows into these accounts offset the systematic 
liquidity risk exposure stemming from issuing loan commitments and lines of credit. 
Our previous work extends KRS by considering the possibility that liquidity 
production could expose banks to systematic liquidity risk.  A bank with many open 
credit lines, for example, may face a problem if, rather than facing just idiosyncratic 
demands for cash, it sometimes faces increased demand for liquidity by many borrowers 
simultaneously.  For example, during the first week of October 1998, following the 
coordinated restructuring of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), 
spreads between safe Treasury securities and risky commercial paper rose dramatically.  
Many large firms were consequently unable to roll over their commercial paper as it 
came due, leading to a sharp reduction in the amount of commercial paper outstanding 
                                                 
6 In a world with taxes, financial distress, or agency costs, holding cash or other liquid assets is costly for 
banks and other firms (e.g. Myers and Rajan, 1998).   7
and a corresponding increase in take-downs on pre-existing lines of credit (Saidenberg 
and Strahan, 1999).  As a result of this market pullback, banks faced a systematic spike in 
demand for cash as many of their largest customers drew funds from pre-existing backup 
lines of credit.  Gatev and Strahan (2006) show, however, that funding supply to banks 
increases as the availability of market liquidity declines.  Thus, banks were able to 
weather the 1998 storm because deposit funding flowed in just as it was needed by 
borrowers. 
Why do banks, as opposed to other financial intermediaries, enjoy funding 
inflows when market liquidity dries up?  First, the banking system has some explicit 
guarantees of its liabilities (government-backed deposit insurance up to $100,000).
7  
Second, banks have access to emergency liquidity support from the central bank.  Third, 
historical precedent suggests that large banks, such as Continental Illinois in the early 
1980s and Citicorp in the early 1990s, may be supported if they face financial distress 
(O’Hara and Shaw, 1990).  Thus, funding inflows occur during market pullback in part 
because banks are rationally viewed as explicitly or implicitly insured by governments.  
Consistent with this notion, Pennacchi (2006) finds that during the years before the 
introduction of federal deposit insurance, bank funding supply did not increase when 
spreads tightened. 
In a case study, Gatev, Schuermann and Strahan (2005) focus on the behavior of 
deposit flows across banks during the 1998 crisis, which began with the Russian 
government bond default in the middle of August.  During the three-months leading up to 
                                                 
7 Deposit insurance limits have recently been expanded for the first time sine 1980.  In addition, some small 
banks have begun to avoid binding limits on deposit insurance by splitting very large deposits across 
multiple institutions.  For a broad discussion for deposit insurance and policy ramifications, see Kroszner 
and Strahan (2005).   8
the crisis, bank stock prices where buffeted by news of the Russian crisis, followed by the 
demise of the hedge fund LTCM in late September, and finally by the drying up of the 
commercial paper market in the first week of October.
8  Chava and Purnanadam (2005) 
provide evidence that the CP market ceased to function at the beginning of October by 
comparing abnormal returns for firms with and without access to this market.  They show 
first that stock prices of CP issuers fell much less than other firms when bank financial 
condition deteriorated during September of 1998 (while markets continued to function).  
During the first two weeks of October, however, the stock prices of all firms, regardless 
of their ability to access the CP market, fell equally.  Thus, all firms became bank 
dependent – even CP issuers - during these weeks because CP markets ceased to function 
and even large corporations relied on banks for liquidity. 
Figure 1 shows the aggregate effects of the 1998 crisis on stock-return volatility.  
We plot bank stock volatility and volatility of the S&P 500, measured as the conditional 
volatility from an EGARCH (1,1) model.  The figure highlights the difference between 
bank risk exposures in different business conditions.  During the crisis, bank stock 
volatility was higher than overall general market volatility, while it was lower in the 
“normal” pre-crisis period. 
To understand how banks weathered this liquidity storm, in Gatev, Schuermann 
and Strahan (2005) we explore the cross-sectional patterns in deposit flows during the 
1998 liquidity crisis.  We found first that investors moved funds from markets into banks; 
second, that banks with higher levels of transactions deposits before the crisis had the 
largest flows of new money during the crisis; and third, that all of the flows of new 
                                                 
8 For policy discussion on LTCM, see Edwards (1999).  For a discussion of bank exposure to the hedge 
funds, see Kho, Dong and Stulz (2002) and Furfine (2002). 
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money were concentrated in bank demand deposits.  So, banks structured to bear 
increased demands for liquidity from borrowers (i.e. banks with transactions deposits) 
could meet those demands easily (because money flowed into those accounts).  Thus, 
government safety nets can explain why banks generally receive funding during crises, 
but the evidence from Gatev et al. as well as Kashyap et al. suggests that the structure of 
banks matters too.   
Before the introduction of government safety nets, transactions deposits could 
sometimes expose banks to liquidity risk when consumers together removed deposits, 
either to increase consumption or because they had lost confidence in the banking system.  
This bank-run problem has traditionally been viewed as the primary source of liquidity 
risk and creates a public policy rationale for FDIC insurance as well as reserve 
requirements for demand deposits (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  In crisis, investors now 
run to banks, not away from them (at least they do in the U.S.).  And, banks funded with 
transactions accounts receive the inflow.  Thus, rather than open banks to liquidity risk, 
transactions deposits today help banks hedge that risk, which now stems more from the 
lending side.  We now turn to our direct tests of this idea. 
 
III.  Empirical Methods 
Sample 
We start by identifying the 100 largest publicly traded domestic banks (based on 
market capitalization) at the beginning of each year from 1990 to 2002.
9  We focus on 
large banks for several reasons.  First, large-bank stocks trade frequently, so daily stock 
                                                 
9 We begin in 1990 because that is the first year when unused retail loan commitments are available which 
we shall control for as a robustness check.  Prior to 1990 only total commitments are reported. 
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returns are available and reliable.  For smaller banks, lack of active trading every day 
poses problems in estimating the conditional volatility model (see below).  Second, large 
banks hold the vast majority of the banking system’s assets.  For example, about 60 
percent of bank assets were held by the 100 largest banks during our sample.  Third, large 
banks are more actively engaged in commitment lending than small banks. 
After identifying the top 100, we drop all banks that engaged in a merger or 
acquisition (M&A) during the year of the deal itself (but not in other years).  For 
example, fifteen of the large banks were involved in M&A in 1990, leaving 85 in our 
sample.
10  Next, we construct the weekly conditional volatility for stock returns for these 
banks (details below).  For our purpose, a week begins and ends on Wednesday, as this is 
the weekday with the fewest public holidays which might close the markets.  We repeat 
this sampling procedure for every year between 1990 and 2002.  Note that it is important 
to drop both acquirers and targets around M&A announcements because speculation 
about such deals generates a large amount of stock price volatility having nothing to do 
with the basic risks banks face (market, credit, liquidity, etc.).  So, for example, we drop 
both JP Morgan and Chase during the year of their merger, but these two banks are 
included as two separate banks in the years prior to the merger, and as a single bank in 
the year after the merger.  As a result, the maximum number of banks in any year is 98 
(2002), and the minimum is 68 (1996).  The sample-generating procedure leaves us with 
170 banks, and almost 50,000 bank-week observations overall. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Traded equity reflects the profits and risk of the entire bank holding company, so our use of the term 
bank refers to the whole holding company.  In collecting characteristics, we use data for the lead bank 
within the holding company.   11
Conditional Mean Volatility 
We construct our conditional stock-return volatilities by fitting daily returns to a 
GARCH (1,1) model for each bank-year, as follows.  Let ri,t+1 be the return for bank i 
from t to t+1.  Then bank returns may be characterized by 
,1 ,1 ,1
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      ( 1 )  
where μi,t+1 is a non-zero, possibly time-varying drift.  For estimation, the innovation εi,t+1 
is assumed to be conditionally normally distributed with time-varying GARCH(1,1) 
volatility as specified in the second equation of (1). 
Based on the coefficients estimated in the GARCH model, we construct daily 
conditional volatility, and then we aggregate up the daily volatilities to weekly 
frequency.
11  Table 1 reports the simple average level of these conditional volatilities, 
normalized to represent the annualized standard deviation of the stock return.  We split 
the data into nine cells, based on the joint distribution of the level of the ratio of 
transactions deposits to total deposits and the level of unused loan commitments to total 
commitments plus total loans (our measure of asset-side liquidity exposure).  This 
admittedly simple table illustrates the main hedging idea of our research: banks with high 
levels of transactions deposits have similar levels of risk regardless of their loan-liquidity 
exposure (column 3).  In contrast, risk increases with loan liquidity risk (unused loan 
commitments) for banks at the low end of the transactions deposits distributions (column 
1).  Increasing unused loan commitments comes with an increase in risk of nearly 30 
                                                 
11 To aggregate volatilities from daily to lower frequencies, say weekly, we take the average over that week 
and scale by 5 , allowing for the possibility of missing days due to, for instance, holidays. 
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percent for these banks (from 0.28 to 0.36).  The same patterns show up in the medians 
within each cell (not reported).  The deposit base therefore seems to act as a natural 
hedge against liquidity exposure from loan commitments.
12 
Regression Specification 
To demonstrate these results more systematically, we estimate an empirical model 
of the conditional volatility as a function of bank liquidity exposure, deposits, and other 
market-level and bank-level characteristics, as follows: 
 
Log(σit) = β0 + β1LoanCommitmentsi,t-1 + β2DepositBasei,t-1 +       
        + β3(LoanCommitmentsi,t-1 *DepositBasei,t-1) +       (2) 
     + Bank-Level and Market-Level Control Variables + ui,t, 
 
where σit is the conditional stock-return volatility for bank i at time t from the first-stage 
GARCH (1,1) model in equation (1); LoanCommitmentsi,t-1 is the ratio of unused loan 
commitments to commitments plus loans (measured in the previous quarter); and, 
DepositBasei,t-1 is the ratio of transactions deposits to total deposits (again, from the prior 
quarter).  If deposits help banks hedge asset-side liquidity risk, as suggested by Table 1, 




                                                 
12 Notice that the hedge seems to go both ways.  That is, for banks with low levels of loan commitments 
(first row), higher transactions deposits come with higher risk (from 0.28 to 0.32).  On the other hand, for 
banks with high levels of commitments, higher transactions deposits come with lower risk (from 0.36 to 
031). 
 
13 We have also estimated regressions like (1) using the level of volatility as well as the square of volatility 
(variance).  These results are similar in terms of statistical and economic significance to those reported 
here.   13
Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
As time-varying controls in the regression, we include the contemporaneous stock 
return volatility for the S&P 500 as a whole, estimated with a GARCH (1,1) model in the 
same fashion as the bank specific volatilities; the three-month T-bill rate; and the spread 
between the high-grade three-month commercial paper rate and the three-month T-bill 
rate.  To be consistent with the conditional volatilities, the interest rate data are taken for 
the Wednesday of a given week. 
For bank-level controls, we include the following: the log of assets (size control), 
the ratio of cash plus securities to total assets (liquid asset measure), the ratio of capital to 
assets (capital adequacy measure), and the ratio of Fed Funds purchased to assets (a 
measure of access to the Fed Funds market, a liquidity pool).  Controlling for size is 
particularly important given its correlation with loan commitments (recall Table 1).  We 
also consider a second loan commitment variable as a robustness test that removes retail 
commitments (e.g. credit card lines) from both the numerator and the denominator of 
LoanCommitmentsi,t-1.  Unused retail commitments may be less likely to expose banks to 
risk relative to business-loan commitments, where take-down demand is both less 
predictable and more likely to have a systematic component such as the one observed in 
the fall of 1998. 
Data on unused commitments, transactions deposits, as well as the other bank 
characteristics, come from the most recent quarter of the Reports of Income and 
Condition (‘call reports’) prior to the time at which we measure the stock return 
variability.  So for example, all weeks in the second quarter of 1990 are matched to call 
report data for first quarter of 1990.  Stock return data come from the Center for   14
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), inclusive of dividend payments and adjusted to 
account for stock splits.  Data on interest rates are available daily from the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors.  Note that since the regulatory data is available only at 
quarterly intervals, the bank characteristics remain unchanged for all weeks within a 
given quarter. 
Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for all of the variables reported in the 
regressions.  Bank-stock volatility averages about 30 percent per year, well above the 16 
percent for the S&P 500 index.  We would expect, of course, index volatility to be lower 
due to portfolio effects.  In our sample, the mean loan commitment ratio is about 0.32 and 
the mean level of transactions deposits to total deposits equals about 0.26.  As in KRS, 
banks with high levels of loan commitment also tend to focus on transactions deposits.  
For instance, 46 percent of the observations in Table 1 line up on the diagonal (relative to 
33 percent if the data were evenly distributed).  For the control variables, we use ratios 
that lie between zero and one, interest rates in percent, or, in the case of assets, we have 
logged the variable.  Hence, there is no concern about outliers driving the results. 
 
IV.  Results 
Main Findings 
Table 3 reports the benchmark set of findings.  We report the regressions from 
equation (2) above using all of our data.  The table reports four specifications, two based 
on the total commitments ratio, and two that exclude retail commitments.  For each of 
these, we report a simple model with just log of assets as a bank control, and a more   15
complex model that adds the liquid assets ratio (cash + securities), the ratio of Fed Funds 
purchased to assets, and the capital-asset ratio.  Note that we have a very large sample 
(almost 50,000 bank-week observations), but we cluster the data by bank to avoid 
assuming independence over time for each bank.  This clustering raises the standard 
errors by a factor of about 10 relative to the OLS standard errors. 
The results in Table 3 support the idea that loan commitment risk (liquidity risk) 
can be hedged with transactions deposits.  The coefficient on the interaction term (β3) is 
negative and highly statistically significant, ranging from -1.6 to -1.7 across the four 
specifications.  For a bank with transactions deposits at the 10
th percentile of its 
distribution (0.12), the coefficients suggest that loan commitments expose banks to risk.  
For such a bank, a one standard deviation increase in the loan commitment ratio would 
come with an increase in stock-return volatility of about 2.5 percentage points (relative to 
a sample standard deviation of about 13 percentage points).  For a bank with transaction 
deposits at the 90
th percentile (0.38), however, the same increase in loan commitments 
comes with an increase in stock-return volatility of just 0.6 percentage points. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between stock-return volatility and unused 
loan commitments, comparing high- and low-transactions deposit banks.  The figure plots 
the predicted volatility based on the regressions coefficients in Table 3 (column 2) for 
banks at the 10
th and 90
th percentiles of the transactions deposit distribution.  As the 
figure shows clearly, risk increases with liquidity exposure from unused loan 
commitments for banks without high levels of transactions deposits.  In contrast, risk 
does not vary with loan commitments for banks with high transactions deposits. 
   16
Robustness Tests 
Tables 4-6 report three robustness tests.  First, we replaced the GARCH (1,1) 
estimate of conditional stock-return volatility with realized volatility (the weekly average 
of squared returns).  Table 5 focuses on the statistical assumptions, and Table 6 focuses 
on the potential for omitted variables bias.  Table 4 shows that the precise modeling 
technique for estimating volatility has almost no impact on any of the coefficients on the 
bank variables.  The variable that accounts for market conditions (the paper-bill spread), 
however, more than doubles and becomes much more statistically powerful.  This makes 
sense because the realized volatilities will adjust immediately to changing market 
conditions, while the GARCH estimates will only do so gradually.  The goodness of fit of 
the model also declines sharply, presumably because, in contrast to the GARCH 
estimates, again because the realized volatilities are not smoothed over time. 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, we report the ‘between’ estimator – that is, the 
regressions are run using bank-level time-series averages.  Thus, coefficients are driven 
only by cross-sectional variation.  We find that the hedging coefficient remains similar to 
the results in Table 3 in terms of magnitudes.  Levels of statistical significance fall 
slightly because the between estimator has just 170 separate banks.  We report the 
‘within’ estimator in columns 3 and 4.  The within estimator, also sometimes called the 
fixed effects estimator, allows each bank to have its own intercept in the regressions.  
Because the bank-level intercept strips out all cross-sectional variation before estimating 
the slope coefficients, the results are driven solely by within-bank variation over time.  
Again, we continue to find strong evidence of the transaction deposit-loan commitment 
diversification synergy.  The results in Table 5 suggest that the hedging effects of   17
combining loan commitments with transactions deposits are present with approximately 
equal magnitude in both the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions. 
Next, we consider the possibility that the observed bank equity risk is driven by 
risks other than liquidity (Table 6).  For example, credit and market risk exposures are 
two of the primary risks faced by banks (and, not coincidentally, these are the risks that 
the Basel Capital Accord focuses on).  We want to rule out the possibility that our results 
reflect credit or market risk exposure rather than liquidity risk exposure.  To test this idea, 
we include the ratio of commercial and industrial loans to assets and commercial real 
estate loans to assets as ex-ante proxies for bank credit risk exposure.  In general, 
business loans are the part of the bank loan portfolio with the most credit risk (Demsetz 
and Strahan, 1997; Stiroh, 2005).
14  We also include the ratio of non-performing loans to 
assets as a measure of ex-post risk, and, in some specifications, we also add the ratio of 
net charge offs to assets, and the ratio of loan loss provisions to assets.
15  To control for 
cross-bank variation in market risk exposure, we include the ratio of trading account 
assets to total assets. 
The results suggest that while our measures for both credit and market risk are 
correlated with stock return volatility in the expected ways, the effects of the liquidity-
risk-offsetting influence of deposits is robust to the inclusion of these other risks 
(columns 1 and 2).  The coefficients on C&I loans and trading account assets enter with 
positive signs (significant in two of the four models).  Even more striking, both non-
performing loans and loan loss provisions have substantial power to explain stock-return 
                                                 
14 Loan losses tend to be high for credit card loans, but these losses are much more predictable than losses 
associated with business lending. 
 
15 Non-performing loans are defined as loans more than 30 days past due plus loans no longer accruing 
interest but not yet charged off the balance sheet.   18
volatility, but the inclusion of these variables has little impact on the coefficients of 
interest.  Most important, the coefficient on the interaction term remains negative and 
significant, and more generally the results are similar to those reported before.  
The last two columns of Table 5 repeat these regressions, but now we replace the 
time-varying control variables (S&P 500 volatility, the level of interest rates, and the 
spread) with a full set of time indicator variables (i.e. a separate intercept for each week).  
The market-level variables are not identified in this model because the time effects sweep 
out all common shocks to bank-stock volatility.  The advantage of this approach is that 
time effects remove any missing common factors that may move bank-stock volatility 
around, such as changes in regulations, macroeconomic shocks, changes in monetary 
policy, and so on.
16  The effects of interest, again, remain robust in these specifications.
17 
Varying Market Conditions 
Table 7 sharpens our benchmark results, and ties the findings more closely to 
liquidity risk.  We compare our model coefficients from ‘normal’ market conditions with 
the coefficients estimated when market liquidity becomes scarce.  During normal 
conditions, the diversification synergy of combining transactions deposits and loan 
commitments comes from reducing the effects of idiosyncratic liquidity demands (as in 
KRS).  Following our earlier work, we use the spread between commercial paper rates 
and T-bill rates as an indicator for the supply of market liquidity.  As we show in Gatev 
and Strahan (2006), when market liquidity becomes scarce, borrowers draw funds from 
                                                 
16 For example, passage of the Financial Modernization Act in 1999 may have increase bank stock return 
volatility temporarily by increasing speculation about merger activity among financial companies. 
 
17 We have also estimated our model for above and below median sized banks.  For both samples we find 
similar results for the coefficients on the loan commitments and transactions deposit variables and their 
interaction, both in terms of magnitudes and levels of significance.   19
pre-existing bank loan commitments at the same time that funding flows into bank 
transaction deposit accounts (Gatev, Schuermann and Strahan, 2005).  Since liquidity 
demands become negatively correlated when spreads rise, we would expect the hedging 
term to become much larger then. 
To test this idea, we separate the data into two regimes, one when the paper-bill 
spread is above 75 basis points (the 95
th percentile of its distribution) and the other when 
the spread is below 75 basis points (Table 7).  By comparison, recall from Table 2 that 
the average CP spread over the sample period is about 40 basis points.  During the 1998 
crisis, the spread rose above 100 basis points.   
The results indicate that transactions deposits do in fact act as a more powerful 
hedge when CP rates are unusually high (Table 7, columns 1 and 2).  When the 
commercial paper spread is above 75 basis points, there is a much stronger positive link 
from loan commitments to risk (the linear coefficient on loan commitments rises from 
0.76 to 1.0), and also a greater hedge associated with transactions deposit (the interaction 
effect nearly triples, from -1.3 to -3.2).
18  The increase in magnitude in the hedging term 
is significant at the two percent level (column 3).  We also find a significant increase in 
the coefficient on bank size.  During normal market conditions, we find no correlation 
between size and volatility, whereas larger banks have higher stock-return volatility than 
smaller banks when CP spreads are wide. 
To understand the economic impact, these coefficients suggest that increased loan 
commitments come with higher risk at banks with low levels of transactions deposits, but 
lower risk for banks with high levels of transactions deposits.  For example, for banks 
                                                 
18 We have also estimated the model during periods of high and low spreads using realized volatility as the 
dependent variable.  In this case, the increase in the magnitude of the hedging term is somewhat larger than 
the increase reported in Table 7.   20
with transactions deposit ratio of 0.38 – at the 90
th percentile of the distribution – an 
increase in loan commitments lowers stock-return volatility by 1.7 percentage points.  
This contrast is made plain in Figure 3, where we plot the relationship between stock-
return volatility and loan commitments during periods of high CP spreads, again 
comparing banks at the 10
th and 90
th percentiles of the transactions deposit distribution.
19 
Table 8 reports a similar test for the effects of varying market conditions.  In these 
models, rather than split the sample into normal and high-spread periods, we simply add 
an interaction between the level of the paper-bill spread and the transactions deposit and 
loan commitment variables.  Here, we again find that the hedging of the two liquidity 
variables is stronger during periods of tight markets (wide spreads).  Together, the results 
of Tables 7 and 8 are consistent with the interpretation of our findings as related to 
liquidity risk by banks because the demands to provide liquidity to borrowers are greatest 
when market spreads widen.  The greater hedging effects are consistent with our earlier 
finding that funding supply to banks increases during period of high spreads, thus 
offsetting the increase in liquidity demands from borrowers during those periods. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
Transactions deposits reduce liquidity-risk exposure stemming from bank lending.  
Banks with high levels of transactions deposits do not face high risk even if they are 
exposed on the asset side to un-drawn loan commitments.  In contrast, banks exposed to 
loan-liquidity risk without high levels of transactions deposits do have high risk.  The 
                                                 
19 We have also separated our transaction deposit variable into demand deposits and other transactions 
deposits.  We find no statistically significant difference across the two – that is, both kinds of transactions 
accounts seem to work to help hedge asset-side liquidity risk.  Thus, we only report the results here for the 
total ratio of transactions deposits to total deposits.   21
deposit-lending hedge becomes especially powerful during periods of tight markets, 
when funds move out of the securities markets and into banks.  The results are 
particularly striking to us because they reverse the standard notion of liquidity risk at 
banks, where runs from depositors had been seen as the cause of trouble (e.g. Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983).  Today, because safety nets protect banks, they are viewed as safe 
havens for funds.  Investors seem to move money into deposits during periods of market 
turmoil.  These funding inflows allowing banks to supply credit when markets can’t or 
won’t.   22
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Know,” mimeo, January 2005.  Table 1: Mean Bank Characteristics, By Transactions Deposits and Unused Commitments
TD < 33rd Percentile 33rd Pct. >= TD < 67th Pct. 67th Pct. <= TD
(1) (2) (3)
Unused Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) (LC)
LC < 33rd Percentile
Stock-return Volatility 0.28 0.29 0.32
(Cash + Securities) / Assets 0.32 0.31 0.33
Assets (Billions of $s) 10.58 10.20 7.14
Fed Funds Purchased / Assets 0.07 0.08 0.07
Equity / Assets 0.08 0.08 0.11
33rd Percentile <= LC < 67th Percentile
Stock-return Volatility 0.29 0.29 0.30
(Cash + Securities) / Assets 0.32 0.31 0.33
Assets (Billions of $s) 17.85 21.64 16.53
Fed Funds Purchased / Assets 0.09 0.10 0.11
Equity / Assets 0.08 0.08 0.07
67th Percentile <= LC
Stock-return Volatility 0.36 0.32 0.31
(Cash + Securities) / Assets 0.34 0.30 0.33
Assets (Billions of $s) 34.63 89.10 83.36
Fed Funds Purchased / Assets 0.07 0.10 0.10
Equity / Assets 0.08 0.08 0.08
Mean Commitments Ratio 0.30 0.31 0.37
Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits (TD): Table 2: Summary Statistics for Variables Included in Regression Models
Standard
Mean Deviation
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
Stock-return Volatility 0.30 0.13
 (Annualized Return Standard Deviation)
Commitments and Deposits
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) 0.32 0.15
(Commitments-Retail Commitments) / 0.24 0.13
   (Commitments-Retail Commitments) + Loans))
Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits 0.26 0.11
Controls for Market Conditions
Volatility of S&P 500 0.16 0.06
 (Annualized Return Standard Deviation)
Commercial Paper - T-Bill Yield Spread (% pts) 0.40 0.21
Yield on Three-Month Treasury Bill (% pts) 4.52 1.55
Controls for Bank Characteristics
Assets (Billions of $s) 34.47 69.89
(Cash + Securities) / Assets 0.32 0.12
Fed Funds Purchased / Assets 0.09 0.06
Equity / Assets 0.08 0.04Table 3: Regressions of Bank Stock Return Volatility on Liquidity Exposure and Transaction Deposits
Ratio
                          Dependent Variable:
Unused Commitments and Deposits (1) (2) (3) (4)
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) 0.788 0.82 - -
(7.19)** (6.94)** - -
(Commitments-Retail Commitments) / - - 0.951 1.005
   (Commitments-Retail Commitments) + Loans)) - - (3.55)** (3.63)**
Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits 0.701 0.772 0.485 0.497
(4.66)** (3.37)** (1.90) (1.80)
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) * -1.604 -1.749 - -
   Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits (4.46)** (3.52)** - -
(Commitments-RC) / (Commitments-RC+Loans) * - - -1.702 -1.709
   Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits - - (2.19)* (2.07)*
Controls for Market Conditions
Log of Volatility of S&P 500 0.494 0.499 0.464 0.46
(21.43)** (20.82)** (16.80)** (16.43)**
Paper-Bill Spread 0.085 0.084 0.103 0.103
(3.79)** (3.80)** (4.53)** (4.51)**
Yield on Three-Month Treasury Bill 0.031 0.03 0.031 0.03
(6.96)** (6.44)** (6.76)** (6.44)**
Controls for Bank Characteristics
Log of Assets -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.012
(0.06) (0.23) (0.57) (0.85)
(Cash + Securities) / Assets - -0.03 - -0.108
- (0.25) - (0.83)
Fed Funds Purchased / Assets - 0.067 - -0.098
- (0.26) - (0.37)
Equity / Assets - -0.174 - 0.095
- (0.41) - (0.22)
Observations 49,527 49,527 49,527 49,527
Number of Independent Clusters (banks) 170 170 170 170
R-squared 28.77% 28.80% 27.86% 28.02%
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by bank.  All regressions include an intercept.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Log of Weekly Bank Stock-Return Volatility
Predicted Volatility from GARCH (1,1)Table 4: Regressions of Bank Stock Return Volatility on Liquidity Exposure and Transaction Deposits
Ratio
                          Dependent Variable:
Unused Commitments and Deposits (1) (2) (3) (4)
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) 0.803 0.859 - -
(7.77)** (7.05)** - -
(Commitments-Retail Commitments) / - - 0.904 0.991
   (Commitments-Retail Commitments) + Loans)) - - (3.33)** (3.31)**
Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits 0.754 0.899 0.545 0.621
(6.04)** (3.53)** (2.37)* (2.03)*
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) * -1.541 -1.811 - -
   Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits (5.00)** (3.36)** - -
(Commitments-RC) / (Commitments-RC+Loans) * - - -1.633 -1.782
   Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits - - (2.20)* (1.98)*
Controls for Market Conditions
Log of Volatility of S&P 500 0.511 0.522 0.481 0.483
(22.01)** (20.62)** (17.35)** (15.84)**
Paper-Bill Spread 0.234 0.231 0.253 0.25
(8.59)** (8.54)** (9.50)** (9.38)**
Yield on Three-Month Treasury Bill 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013
(3.17)** (2.61)** (2.98)** (2.64)**
Controls for Bank Characteristics
Log of Assets 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009
(0.03) (0.24) (0.32) (0.60)
(Cash + Securities) / Assets - -0.039 - -0.1
- (0.30) - (0.70)
Fed Funds Purchased / Assets - -0.016 - -0.187
- (0.06) - (0.66)
Equity / Assets - -0.379 - -0.113
- (0.78) - (0.23)
Observations 49,527 49,527 49,527 49,527
Number of Independent Clusters (banks) 170 170 170 170
R-squared 12.37% 12.41% 11.80% 11.87%
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by bank.  All regressions include an intercept.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Log of Weekly Bank Stock-Return Volatility
Realized VolatilityTable 5: Regressions of Bank Stock Return Volatility on Liquidity Exposure and Transaction Deposits
Ratio - Between vs. Within Estimator
                          Dependent Variable:
Unused Commitments and Deposits (1) (2) (3) (4)
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) 0.762 0.805 0.202 0.082
(4.58)** (3.94)** (1.41) (0.60)
Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits 0.815 1.013 0.281 0.237
(3.55)** (2.98)** (0.98) (0.85)
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) * -1.384 -1.739 -1.668 -1.492
   Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits (2.00)* (2.08)* (2.64)** (2.53)*
Controls for Market Conditions
Log of Volatility of S&P 500 0.549 0.569 0.447 0.452
(6.52)** (6.47)** (24.61)** (25.01)**
Paper-Bill Spread -1.84 -1.783 0.163 0.162
(4.48)** (4.22)** (8.63)** (8.60)**
Yield on Three-Month Treasury Bill 0.204 0.195 0.024 0.024
(5.39)** (4.85)** (5.11)** (5.15)**
Controls for Bank Characteristics
Log of Assets -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 0.011
(0.83) (0.72) (0.59) (0.41)
(Cash + Securities) / Assets - 0.057 - 0.225
- (0.38) - (1.59)
Fed Funds Purchased / Assets - -0.013 - -0.458
- (0.04) - (1.93)
Equity / Assets - -0.527 - -1.125
- (0.84) - (2.22)*
Observations 49,527 49,527 49,527 49,527
Number of Independent Clusters (banks) 170 170 170 170
R-squared 39.81% 40.15% 29.73% 30.28%
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by bank.  All regressions include an intercept and bank effects.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Log of Weekly Bank Stock-Return Volatility
Between Estimator Within EstimatorTable 6: Regressions of Bank Stock Return Volatility on Liquidity Exposure and Transaction Deposits
Ratio - Add Controls for Credit Risk, Market Risk & Time Dummies
Unused Commitments and Deposits (1) (2) (3) (4)
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) 0.671 0.569 0.665 0.563
(5.81)** (4.93)** (6.11)** (5.11)**
Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits 0.372 0.346 0.539 0.53
(2.09)* (2.09)* (3.12)** (3.25)**
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) * -1.41 -1.235 -1.36 -1.23
   Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits (3.39)** (3.25)** (3.43)** (3.31)**
Controls for Market Conditions
Log of Volatility of S&P 500 0.512 0.504 - -
(23.07)** (22.37)** - -
Paper-Bill Spread 0.103 0.114 - -
(4.48)** (4.88)** - -
Yield on Three-Month Treasury Bill 0.027 0.026 - -
(5.39)** (5.29)** - -
Controls for Bank Characteristics
Log of Assets -0.017 -0.012 -0.021 -0.017
(1.48) (1.15) (1.81) (1.63)
(Cash + Securities) / Assets 0.287 0.373 0.159 0.252
(2.15)* (2.82)** (1.33) (2.11)*
Fed Funds Purchased / Assets 0.138 0.141 0.165 0.168
(0.56) (0.58) (0.71) (0.73)
Equity / Assets 0.475 0.578 0.386 0.431
(1.87) (2.48)* (1.49) (1.66)
Controls for Credit & Market Risks
C&I Loans / Assets 0.366 0.415 0.254 0.31
(2.07)* (2.38)* (1.35) (1.68)
Commercial Real Estate Loans / Assets -0.154 0.008 -0.306 -0.166
(0.60) (0.03) (1.14) (0.64)
Non-Performing Loans / Assets 11.512 8.561 9.959 7.45
(5.82)** (4.50)** (4.51)** (3.75)**
Trading Assets / Assets 0.388 0.498 0.315 0.417
(1.93) (2.62)** (1.75) (2.42)*
Loan Loss Provisions / Assets - 22.46 - 20.164
- (4.88)** - (4.65)**
Net Charge-offs / Assets - 14.73 - 16.688
- (1.94) - (2.32)*
Includes Weekly Indicators? No No Yes Yes
Observations 49,527 49,527 49,527 49,527
Number of Independent Clusters (banks) 170 170 170 170
R-squared 36.59% 37.62% 49.53% 50.41%
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by bank.  All regressions include an intercept.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Log of Weekly Bank Stock-Return Volatility
Dependent Variable:Table 7: Regressions of Bank Stock Return Volatility on Liquidity Exposure and Transaction Deposits
Ratio - Hi and Low Paper-Bill Spread Regimes
P-Value
Paper-Bill Spread: <75 Bps >=75 Bps H0:(1)=(2)
Unused Commitments and Deposits (1) (2) (3)
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) 0.761 1.002 0.212
(8.12)** (4.67)**
Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits 0.632 1.396 0.057
(3.35)** (3.11)**
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) * -1.317 -3.196 0.02
   Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits (3.42)** (3.47)**
Controls for Bank Characteristics
Log of Assets -0.006 0.042 0.001
(0.56) (2.53)*
(Cash + Securities) / Assets -0.063 -0.304 0.12
(0.60) (1.74)
Fed Funds Purchased / Assets 0.129 0.316 0.617
(0.52) (0.88)
Equity / Assets 0.411 -0.765 0.043
(1.38) (1.18)
P-Value for F-Test that all coefficients are equal - - 0.001
Includes Weekly Indicators? Yes Yes -
Observations 46,856 2,671 -
Number of Independent Clusters (banks) 170 154 -
R-squared 43.53% 39.39% -
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by bank.  All regressions include an intercept.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
  Log of Weekly Bank Stock Return Volatility      
Dependent Variable:Table 8: Regressions of Bank Stock Return Volatility on Liquidity Exposure and Transaction Deposits
Ratio - With Paper-Bill Spread Interaction Terms
                          Dependent Variable:
Unused Commitments and Deposits (1) (2)
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) 0.709 0.609
(4.05)** (3.91)**
Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits 0.575 0.337
(2.79)** (2.15)*
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) * -0.901 -0.477
   Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits (1.80) (1.07)
Interaction Between Paper-Bill Spread and:
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) 0.274 0.554
(0.82) (1.64)
Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits 0.624 1.204
(2.07)* (2.45)*
Commitments / (Commitments + Loans) * -2.044 -3.042
   Transactions Deposits / Total Deposits (2.49)* (2.71)**
Controls for Bank Characteristics
1
Includes Weekly Indicators? Yes Yes
Observations 49,527 49,527
Number of Independent Clusters (banks) 170 170
R-squared 45.59% 45.87%
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by bank.  All regressions include an intercept.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
1Column 1 includes log of assets and its interaction with the Paper-Bill Spread; column 2 adds the liquid assets ratio
the capital-asset ratio and the ratio of fed funds purchased to assets, as well as their interactions with the CP spread.
Included, coefficients not reported
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